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Abstract: 
This essay attempts to answer the question as in the title by reviewing 
previous literature on category-specific semantic impairments among brain-
damaged patients, describing what kind of concepts are lost and preserved, 
and shows models accounting for the loss and preservation of certain 
concepts.
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1. Review of category-specific semantic impairment 
Concepts are ways in which people categorise the world in order to 
understand it and communicate with it (Baddeley, 1998, p. 231). Therefore, 
a concept like DOG is used to refer to what poodles and borzois and 
bull terriers and great danes have all in common. A concept like DOG is 
undoubtedly linked with superordinate concepts such as ANIMAL and PET, 
and subordinate concepts such as GREAT DANE (ibid.).
      Research on the effects of brain damage on patients has revealed that 
knowledge about particular semantic categories is damaged, whilst leaving 
that of other related ones intact (Harley, 2008, p. 346). Category-specific 
semantic deficits have provided insights into how semantic knowledge may 
be organised in the human brain (Pilrgim et al., 2005). Warrington and 
McCarthy (1983) reported a case of an aphasic patient with a semantic 
impairment, who was able to name and recognise the relevant semantic 
attributes of animate objects such as foods and flowers, but unable to do 
to so when shown inanimate objects. An opposite case was found a year 
later by Warrington and Shallice (1984), where one of their patients, JBR 
performed much better at naming inanimate objects. He also had a relative 
comprehension deficit for living things. At first glance, this suggests that 
semantic memory is divided into animate - inanimate categories, however, 
the fact is that JBR has been reported to be good at naming parts of the 
body, even though these are parts of living things. On the other hand, he 
was also poor at naming musical instruments, foodstuffs, types of cloth, 
and precious stones, even though these are obviously inanimate objects. 
JBR seemed to be impaired with his semantic concept of animate objects 
after brain damage due to the loss of the animate category in the brain, but 
maintained his concept of inanimate things.
      Since their work (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1983), various category-
specific dissociations have been reported, for example, between concrete 
and abstract words (Tyler et al., 1995; Warrington, 1981) and between nouns 
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and verbs (e.g., Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Daniele et al., 1994). Relatively 
recently, consensus regarding the basic facts of category-specific semantic 
deficits has emerged: the categories that can be disproportionately impaired 
or spared are “animals,” “fruit/vegetables,” and “artefacts” (Caramazza & 
Mahon, 2003). However, the most commonly reported category-specific 
semantic deficit, is the double dissociation between living and non-living 
things.
      Patients with more specific semantic impairments have been observed 
and described by Harley (2008, p. 346); Hart, Berndt, and Caramazza 
(1985) had a patient, MD, who had specific difficulties in naming fruits 
and vegetables; PC (Semenza & Zettin, 1988) had selective difficulty with 
proper names; BC (Crosson et al., 1997) only had difficulty with medical 
instruments. Crosson et al. (1997) explain that although the stimulus words 
(medical item lists) were found to differ from non-medical item lists in 
imageability and abstractness, their patients’, category-specific deficit did not 
seem to be caused by word frequency, concept familiarity, imageability, or 
abstractness. Nor could BC’s performance be explained in terms of deficits 
in broader semantic categories such as animate vs inanimate or man-made 
vs natural. He was unable to retrieve medical items even when he was given 
phonemic cues for those he could not name. Their findings indicate that 
the damage in the dominant pulvinar, which is the largest nucleus of the 
thalamus and strongly connected with the visual cortex (Benarroch, 2015, 
p. 738), may create category-specific deficits. Damage to the temporal pole 
has been shown to cause a loss of distinctions between items that are very 
similar semantically, whereas distinctions between highly dissimilar area 
concepts are maintained (Rogers et al. 2004).
      Ingram (2007, p. 233) constructed a tree diagram which represents a 
taxonomy of terms frequently used to describe different semantic deficits 
based on Capitani et al’s review (2003). The figure shows hierarchically 
arranged terms into superordinate-subordinate categories with  their 
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feasible affiliations. The categories written in bold are the ones more 
frequently mentioned. According to the figure, the word apple is, first of 
all, categorised as a concrete object. It is then judged whether it is animate 
or inanimate, and put into the animate category. The animate category has 
two subordinate categories, which are animals and plants. After being put 
into the plants category without any doubt, apple reaches the bottom of the 
taxonomy; fruit & vegetable.
      The more usual pattern is that knowledge of living things is found to be 
disproportionately impaired in relation to non-living things (e.g., Warrington 
& Shallice, 1984). On the other hand, a few patients have also been reported 
to become unable to recognise non-living things contrary to their relatively 
preserved knowledge of living things (e.g., Damasio et al., 2004; Warrington 
& McCarthy, 1983). There have been several models which have attempted 
to explain category-specific deficits, which will be explained below.
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2. Models accounting for category-specific semantic deficits 
One of the models which has attempted to account for the above-
mentioned pattern of preserved and impaired knowledge is the sensory-
functional model (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1994; Warrington 
& Shallice, 1984). This model argues that the dissociation between living 
and non-living concepts can be explained in terms of their properties, e.g., 
visual, functional, tactile, etc. Hence, living concepts are more reliably 
distinguished by their sensory properties, while making a distinction among 
non-living concepts depends more on their functional properties. Here 
again, there have been some contradictory findings that some patients have 
difficulty processing sensory information but do not show a specific deficit 
for living objects (e.g., Lambon-Ralph et al., 1998). Moreover, patients with 
living objects deficits should have more difficulty with sensory compared 
to functional properties. Nevertheless, this prediction has not always been 
supported (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) and some patients have shown 
a contradictory pattern, with greater difficulties with the functional properties 
of living objects (e.g., Lambon-Ralph et al., 1998).
      A category-specific account has been proposed partly in response to the 
limitations of the sensory-functional account, combining a prototype theory 
of semantic structure with an evolutionary perspective on brain organisation. 
Caramazza and Shelton’s (1998) hypothesis denotes that evolutionary 
pressures have resulted in specialised mechanisms for animals, plants, and 
probably some non-living concepts (e.g., tools) and that this has led to such 
knowledge being categorically organised in the brain. Category-specific 
semantic deficits, such as an impairment for fruit and vegetables, would 
be linked to prototype identification systems that serve specific biological 
functions (e.g., recognition of edible natural plants) (Ingram, 2007, p. 235). 
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) argue that semantic knowledge is organised 
into broad categories reflecting evolutionarily salient distinctions in semantic 
knowledge, supported by distinct neural structures that may be damaged 
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independently of one another.
      Conceptual structure account (e.g., Tyler & Moss, 2001) is the final 
model that has attempted to specify the reason why there are some patients 
whose living objects concepts are spared, whereas, non-living concepts are 
lost. It argues that it is the distribution of distinctive and shared properties, 
and the correlations between them, that are the key to the pattern of spared 
and impaired knowledge across domains. Correlated properties occur 
frequently and are more resilient to damage because they support each 
other with mutual activation. Living and non-living domains have differently 
correlated properties. The former tend to have shared properties which are 
strongly correlated, while their distinctive properties are relatively weakly 
correlated. The latter tend to have fewer shared properties which are 
generally not highly correlated and strong form-function correlations among 
distinctive properties (e.g., Randall et al., 2004; Tyler & Moss, 2001).
3. Conclusion 
This essay has demonstrated what kind of concepts are maintained and 
impaired by describing previous studies on category-specific semantic 
disorders. Some concepts have been found to be maintained and lost among 
particular patients (e.g., animate-inanimate and verbs-nouns). Caramazza 
(1998) mentions that theories developed to explain category-specific 
semantic deficits fall into two groups. Theories in the first group, based on 
the neural structure principle, assume dissociable neural substrates and are 
differentially (or exclusively) involved in representing different semantic 
categories. Theories in the second group, based on the correlated structure 
principle, assume that conceptual knowledge of items from different 
semantic categories is not represented in functionally dissociable regions of 
the brain.
      Theories based on the neural structure principle illustrate that category-
specific semantic deficits are due to differential or selective damage to the 
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neural substrate upon which the impaired category of items depends (e.g., 
Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1994; Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Mahon 
& Caramazza, 2009). In addition, although the models mentioned above 
have not been reliably verified and remain within the bounds of hypothesis, 
the reasons why some concepts are spared and some are lost are due to 
the evolutionary pressures on semantic knowledge which have led it to 
categorically organise in the brain, and the degree of correlation between 
shared and distinctive properties and their frequency.
      Ingram (2007, p. 233) points out, however, that care must be exercised 
when construing classifications of semantic deficit. There are also a number 
of methodological issues in studying category-specific semantic disorders; for 
instance, if frequency is important in brain-damaged naming, an artefactual 
effect will show up unless care is taken to control for frequency across 
the categories (Harley, 2008, p. 347). Individual interests, and patterns of 
habitual exposure to particular knowledge domains, are clearly relevant for 
interpreting profiles of test performance. In a few cases where conservation 
of abstract objects but impaired identification of concrete objects has been 
found, subjects are in most cases professionals with a high level of education, 
experienced in practicing high levels of abstract verbal expressions in their 
daily work (Crutch & Warrington, 2003). Hence, these issues might have 
caused difference in results of the previous studies on which concepts are 
kept and which ones are not. There need to be more thorough investigations 
into the control for the features of the subjects and tasks given to them so 
as to obtain more reliable results about which concepts are kept and which 
ones are not, and why.
      From a practical point of view, it is considerably easier to talk about 
concrete concepts than abstract ones (e.g., Taylor, 1969). It has been 
interestingly found that abstract words such as “prayer” activates related 
concrete words such as “candle,” but concrete words such as “candle” do 
not seem to activate closely related abstract words such as ‘‘solace’’ (e.g., 
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Field, 2004, p. 159; Kiran et al., 2009, p. 837). Indeed, when my students 
are given a picture taboo task, they find it easy to explain concrete ideas 
such as “lights,” but particularly demanding to describe abstract ideas such 
as “education.” Nonetheless, as abstract reasoning (e.g., Carbonneau et al., 
2013; Thorndike, 1920), one of many mental abilities, is a crucial capacity 
to function in a socially ideal manner, it would be beneficial for our students 
to perform tasks involving reasoning, planning, problem-solving, abstract 
thinking, comprehension of complex ideas (e.g., Goswami, 2019) in order for 
them to maintain their neurocognitive capacity to process abstract meaning 
which is subserved by the right hemisphere (e.g., Yang, 2014), since there is 
no guarantee that no one will suffer brain damage of any form as they age.
*This article is a revised version of an unpublished manuscript submitted 
during a Master of Philosophy in English and Applied Linguistics programme 
at the Research Centre for English and Applied Linguistics of the University 
of Cambridge in 2009.
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